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Abstract
The scope of this article is to analyze the implementation of forest policy and the role played by Blairo Borges
Maggi, in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, during the period 2003-2010, namely the years coinciding, in the
main, with both Lula’s term of office as President and with Maggi’s governorship of the Mato Grosso state. The
approach and conditions of the policy were based on non-invasive technology – such as remote sensing
imagery and a Geographic Information System (GIS) database regarding deforestation areas – and attempted
to effectively control part of the deforestation in the State. An apparent contradiction was created, since the
state governor is closely linked to the agribusiness sector. We draw on Gramsci’s concept of the organic
intellectual in our analysis and explanation of this paradox in the Mato Grosso state, in order to understand
the role played by Maggi in the process. Thus, we formulate the hypothesis that classifies the governor of the
Mato Grosso state as not a revolutionary organic intellectual, as some might argue, but an organic intellectual
whose reformist proposals are aimed at maintaining the hegemony of his particular group, which – in turn –
sees the environmental theme as a threat to this hegemony.
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Organic Intellectuals: Legitimizing Agribusiness Production
in Brazil
Carlos Hiroo Saito and Andréa A. Azevedo
1. Introduction
In the period under study (2003-2010), environmentalist and
agribusiness representatives were in mutual opposition regarding
the enforcement of the Forest Code: from the agribusiness point of
view, application of this legal norm would possibly see a reduction
of the productive area in the Mato Grosso (MT) state; from the
environmentalists’ point of view, enforcement of the law was the
only one way to control deforestation, hence the necessity to
monitor this enforcement.
The Mato Grosso state, in the Midwest region of Brazil, greatly
expanded its Gross Domestic Product in the decade 1990-2000,
based mainly on a horizontal growth of its areas of agricultural
production. To put this growth in perspective, from 1992 to 2007,
the state of Mato Grosso doubled the amount of deforestation as
compared with what had happened up to 1992 (an increase of
105%), representing approximately an additional deforestation of
18 million hectares (180 thousand km2), an area corresponding to
almost one and a half times that of England (Azevedo, 2009).
According to the Mato Grosso Environment Minister, from 2003
to 2007 almost 7 million hectares were deforested. Moreover, in
2002, the state elected as governor Blairo Borges Maggi, popularly
regarded as “the King of Soy”, one of the largest producers of this
commodity in the world, “the hardest working man in the Brazilian
soy business” according to Forbes Magazine, and a man who in
2014 joined the ranks of the world’s billionaires.
Nevertheless, it was under this governor that the Mato Grosso
state consolidated a supposed green policy. In 2000, Mato Grosso
began implementing a monitoring system, with seemingly ideal
technological support, to enforce the Brazilian Forest Code. This
had been stipulated by a 1965 law governing environmental
conservation in private areas in Brazil, and remained in force until
its substitution in 2012 by subsequent legislation. This legal code,
known as SLAPR (Sistema de Licenciamento Ambiental para
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Propriedades Rurais” or “System for Environmental Licensing of
Rural Properties”), in its conceptual design contained the
integration of licensing (information), monitoring (satellite images)
and an inspection conducted from the monitoring step
(enforcement). The system reached its full development in 2003,
and farmers entering the system had their deforestation areas
monitored by satellite images, in order to obtain a certificate of
legal conformity that their deforestation areas was maintaining the
reservation areas determined by law. The certification itself is
obtained through the Mato Grosso Legal Program, created by the
governor in 2008.
Bieler and Morton (2003, p. 1) recommend trying to “find out,
through an empirical analysis, which social forces attempt to
formulate a hegemonic project around which ideas” and
investigating how the “forces of capital become internalized in a
particular form of state or how they are resisted”. Our study is
based on an empirical case investigation of the production structure
and, in attempting to characterize the social forces who are the key
collective actors, thus fits well into Bieler and Morton’s framework
and the methodological challenges that these authors address. We
bring into play Gramsci’s concept of organic intellectual in order to
seek theoretical support to explain the paradox of the Mato Grosso
state and understand the role played by state governor Maggi (20032010) in the process, as well as the strategy employed by him at that
moment in time, which resulted in the change of the Brazilian
Forest Code. Thus the argument we adduce here is that, despite the
declared profile of the Mato Grosso state governor as a politician
putting forward reformist environmentalist proposals, he should be
regarded as an organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector,
dedicated to the maintenance of the hegemony of that group.
2. The reaction of agribusiness to environmental criticism: the System for
Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties enters the scene
In 1999/2000 the first public policy instrument was produced,
and proclaimed to be being capable of licensing and monitoring
and, thus, effectively overseeing the implementation of the Forest
Code in the Amazon. The rationale for the policy makers was based
on assumptions that the data on deforestation in the Mato Grosso
108
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state could only be truly known if there was reliable information,
and that this information, if used correctly, could generate control
and ensure the implementation of the Forest Code. This, then, was
the logic lying behind the new system, and the big news was that
this would be done using remote sensing technology combined
with a Geographic Information System (GIS), providing licensing
which would be able to identify individually each farm where there
is agricultural activity. This identification of property, including the
demarcation of the Legal Reserve and Permanent Preservation
Areas, would be a key instrument to facilitate the monitoring of
deforestation, defining them as legal or illegal activities, and to
name the possible offenders.
The political-economic justification for the implementation of
instruments of control (SLAPR being an example of this) relies
exactly on this possibility of distinguishing between legal and illegal
deforestation. By this differentiation, it would be possible to
respond to society and to international public opinion, which are
demanding that the State should adopt a clear position in face of
the increasing deforestation. This would legalize at least part of the
agriculture activities within the Mato Grosso state, since rural
property could be licensed. The legalization would legitimize this
form of production through alleged control by the State.
The technical secretary in the Federal Subprogram of Natural
Resources of the Ministry of the Environment was interviewed
regarding the implementation of SLAPR in the Mato Grosso state
and explicitly defined the commercial and economic role SLAPR
could have. The original idea, he stated, was that the use of
technology involved in the system would make it possible to verify,
in the near future, the environmental situation of a licensed
property on any computer on the planet and so it would be possible
to develop a certified market for products of the Mato Grosso state
(Azevedo, 2009).
In fact, legalization of deforestation occurred within the system.
Within licensed rural properties, comparing the 1995-1999 period
(before implementation of the system) with the 2000-2007 period
(after its implementation), there was an increase in deforestation of
about 32%. The control sample, with rural properties outside the
system, indicates that deforestation increased by only 1% from the
first to the second period. However, in the second period (after
109
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implementation), only the SLAPR sample was legal. This means
that the implementation of SLAPR, instead of reducing
deforestation, allowed its expansion, ensuring however a Statesanctioned status of legal deforestation. Except for some
deforestation within the Legal Reserve (about 2.6% of the licensed
area until 2006), all deforestation had a formal permission from the
State (Azevedo 2009). In this institutional setting, the policy has
enhanced a synergy between economic and the ecological logics
(Rajão and Hayes 2009), with the numbers creating an illusion that
Mato Grosso state was on the way to ending illegal logging.
3. The legitimacy of capitalism and hegemony over environmental concern
To understand the apparent paradox between economic status
and the implementation of environmental policies, it is important to
refer to a theoretical support to explain the changes that capitalism
has assimilated after the emergence of environmental concern.
The Mato Grosso state has entered the list of environmentalist
criticisms as a major world grain producer, achieved at the expense
of losing a large portion of natural areas, including those with high
environmental fragility (i.e. large areas of the headwaters of the
Amazon basin and the Pantanal). Boltanski and Chiapello (2002)
argue that the criticism of capitalism undermines the pillars for its
justifications. But, for the end of capitalism, this interpretation is
too simple and deterministic.
During the increasing occupation of the Amazon over the last 50
years, several institutional logics have set the tone for
environmental policies and the technologies used in these policies.
These logics have formed over time and sometimes work in
synergy, and sometimes in conflict, and are often present
simultaneously: such is the case of ecological and economic logics
(Rajão and Hayes 2009). This complex context reveals an apparent
contradictory behavior especially in those stakeholders more bound
to an economic logic, since, while they fear and condemn the
increasing appreciation of the ecological discourse, they are also
simultaneously becoming aware that they must somehow seek
engagement in this discourse; at the same time, however, their
practices do not represent full adherence to the green agenda. This
may be interpreted as a parallel to Gramsci’s analysis of any system
110
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of crystallized ideas when faced with current practical needs: a
“struggle between conservation and revolution, etc., between what
was thought in the past and the new thinking; between the old that
refuses to die and the new that wants to live, etc.” (Q6, § 139,
Gramsci 1975, p. 311; Gramsci 2007, p. 110).
It is important to say that the resulting processes may be only an
adaptive simulacrum of the expected changes, and do not imply a
real greening revolution. Capitalism has appropriated the nonconflictive concept of Sustainable Development and also
introduced it in the market system through various policies that
have sought to overcome the conflicting sides in the dialectic of
development: the environment and economic growth. (Leff 2006;
Martinez-Alier and Jusmet 2001). Thus, a reformist market came to
be established in order to meet worldwide environmental criticism
after the 1980s. National environmental laws started to be
demanded as a guarantee for international credits and access to
foreign markets. In addition to national laws, the market begins to
reward those business groups that did more than legally required or
in some way proved that their so-called best practices constituted “the
green seal” (Leff 2006).
In this way, from nature now converted into natural capital,
capitalism has dictated a new geopolitics, drawing a new topological
design of the international division of labor. Northern countries,
with an intensive production of knowledge in industrial and
agricultural sectors, are “colonizing” practices in the South,
especially as regards multinationals selling ready-made technology
packages. Thus, countries in the South are being increasingly seen
as exporters of natural capital (Azevedo et al. 2007).
The Mato Grosso state is an emblematic case of the new
international division of labor after the globalization of world
markets. This state has specialized in the production of agricultural
commodities with a high environmental cost in terms of loss of
biodiversity and erosion of various other natural resources such as
soil, water (by deforestation practice and the establishment of an
industrial agriculture), and the consequent contribution of these
practices to global warming (Nepstad 2006; Santilli et al. 2005;
Fearnside 2005).
This process of a great increase in agricultural production, seen
particularly since 1998, has been not only a process spurred on by
111
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local forces and the entrepreneurship of migrants. All the
infrastructure provided by public and private investments, such as
the location of large buyers of grain crushers, funding for storage
structures, and the logistics for transportation, have been important
vectors as part of this dynamic (Becker 2007). Furthermore, this
process has a direct interface with international demands as regards
specialized commodities producers (Nepstad 2005), the regional
history of land owning and land concentration, and also national
government desires to gain more foreign currency by commodity
exportation, thereby contributing to obtaining a balance of
payments surplus (Rajão 2008). In short, the Mato Grosso state has
assembled a number of conditions to play the desired role in the
new international division of labor, including technological,
economic, political and even ideological aspects.
However, in the late 1990s, despite the stimulus of a globalized
economy, the environmental critique had struck at the agribusiness
sector very strongly, arguing against its consequences. The Mato
Grosso state was pictured as one with very high rates of
deforestation (as had occurred in 1995) and with alarming levels of
burnings (as was seen in 1998). Something needed to be done so
that these criticisms of the environmental aspect of production
could be softened, and the agribusiness enterprises could be
legitimized as environmentally responsible. This legitimation is part
of the continued accumulation of capitalism in an exercise of
hegemony “without force predominating excessively over consent”,
as Gramsci explains (Q 13, §37, Gramsci 1975, p. 1638;
summarized in Gramsci 1971, p. 80n; cf. also the first draft, Q 1,
§48; Gramsci 1975, p. 59; Gramsci 1994, p. 156). The US scholar
Michael Goldberg explains that hegemony “means the success of
the dominant classes in presenting their definition of reality, their
view of the world, in such a way that it is accepted by other classes
as ‘common sense’. The general ‘consensus’ is that it is the only
sensible way of seeing the world” (https://faculty.washington.edu/
mlg/courses/definitions/hegemony.html). In the words of another
commentator, “Belief, faith, dogmatism may be understood as
embryonic forms of hegemony, but a fully developed hegemony is a
form of intellectual and moral leadership in which the mass of the
population understands its own interests as being fundamentally
compatible with the dominant social group” (Riley 2011, p. 12).
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International Gramsci Journal No. 6 (2nd Series / Seconda Serie) March / Marzo 2017

Thus, legitimacy in this case represents the construction and
maintenance of the hegemony of the agribusiness sector to dictate
the way in which the land surface in the state is occupied and used,
integrating urban and rural areas beyond the economic practice of
agribusiness. This legitimacy also means the acceptance and rational
justification of this land occupation and use by society in general,
which means not only the agribusiness sector but also small
producers, policy makers and even some environmentalists. It is
opportune to remember that Gramsci believed that hegemony was
ultimately rooted in economic power, as one of the expressions of
class struggle through a combination of force and consent (Brosio
1994, p. 50). Gramsci in fact noted that “for though hegemony is
ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based
on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the
decisive nucleus of the economy” (Q 13, §18, Gramsci 1975; p.
1591; Gramsci, 1971, p. 161).
Hall (1996, p. 417) follows this reasoning, and while arguing that
once hegemony is not exclusively an ideological phenomenon but
must have a base in “the decisive nucleus of the economy”,
combats a mechanistic viewpoint that tends “to see all other
dimensions of the social formation as simply mirroring ‘the
economic’ […], as having no other determining or structuring force
in their own right”. Buckel and Fischer-Lescano (2009) also
reinforce this idea. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is related to his
view of power as a social construction related to economic,
political, moral, intellectual, cultural and ideological questions and
also articulated to the concept of the historical bloc and their
agents. The historical bloc is seen as a result of the structure and
superstructure in which “the complex, contradictory and discordant
ensemble of the superstructure is the reflection of the ensemble of
the social relations of production” (Q 8, §182; Gramsci 1975, p.
1051; Gramsci 1971, p. 366), creating an organic cohesion between
intellectuals and people-nation (Q 11, §67; Gramsci 1975, p. 15056; Gramsci 1971, p. 418) responsible for promoting a political
initiative able to “liberate the economic thrust from the dead weight
of traditional policies” (Q 13, §23; Gramsci 1975, p. 1612; Gramsci
1971, p. 168). The question hinges around how this organic
cohesion can be created, and who the agent of this process may be,
i.e. whether it can be forged by representatives of the economic
113
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hegemonic group or class. That is why Smith (2010) argues in favor
of proximity of the hegemony concept to the leadership notion
rather than the dominance one.
Therefore, in addition to these macro-structural aspects, there is
a need to analyze the role played by specific social agents, which
may be decisive for a possible strengthening of the tendency of a
line of discourse and public policies, which are able both to spread
illusions and build new hegemonies in the public sphere.
Fischman and McLaren (2005) remind us that the features of
consent and coercion that underlie Gramsci’s model of hegemonic
domination are dynamic categories, both forming part of the
process to achieve supremacy:
A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate’,
or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups.
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before
winning governmental power (…); it subsequently becomes dominant when it
exercise power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to
‘lead’ as well (Q 19, §24; Gramsci 1975, p. 2010; Gramsci 1971, pp. 57-58).

Because of this leadership component, which means that
“hegemonic relationships not only play an ethical role but also a
pedagogical one” (Fischman and McLaren, 2005, p. 3), when we
integrate this pedagogical role with economic interest, we need to
recognize that “hegemony requires the transcendence of narrow
factional interests. Economic interests reflect into ideological
consciousness” (Gündogan 2008, p. 52). That is why a profound
look into the supposed agribusiness greening of the Mato Grosso
state is important, as a first step to admitting the possibility of rearticulation into an alternative hegemonic practice. Or, in the
present case study, it can describe its reinforcing practice.
How then is it possible to create an illusion that agribusiness in
the Mato Grosso state could be on the path of conversion to an
environmentally friendly practice? How could the state government,
headed by the largest producer of soybeans (thus the expression of
the presence of agribusiness at the helm of regional political
power), be recognized as an environmentally-friendly government
without creating an internal conflict around the person of the
governor and his productive roots? What role could he (governor
Maggi) have to serve the interests of the economic sector he still
114
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represents? These are the central questions to be posed to this
study.
In this sense, it seems worthwhile examining the concept of
organic intellectual in the light of that context.
4. The concept of organic intellectual in hegemonic meanings
In Gramsci (Q 12, §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1513; Gramsci 1971, p. 5), we
read that
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an
essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with
itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity
and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the
social and political fields. The capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself
the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy, the organisers of a
new culture, of a new legal system etc. It should be noted that the entrepreneur
himself represents a higher level of social elaboration, already characterised by
a certain directive and technical (i.e. intellectual) capacity: he must have a
certain technical capacity not only in the limited sphere of his activity and
initiative but in other spheres as well, at least in those which are closest to
economic production. He must be an organiser of masses of men; he must be
an organiser of the ‘confidence’ of investors in his business, of the customers
for his product, etc.

Thus, a first hypothesis is that governor Maggi could be
embodying the role of Gramscian concept of an organic intellectual
linked this time to agribusiness. However, several objections have
been raised about this hypothesis.
A first objection arose from non-Gramscian researchers, who
demonstrated the attachment to the concept of traditional
intellectual. In this context, an intellectual means someone whose
intellectual status would be recognized by Academia as a result of
accumulated titles and/or the activity of theoretical elaboration.
These intellectuals always come from a group of experts of practical
knowledge, such as lawyers, mathematicians, doctors, teachers,
whose quantitative presence in a given society depends on its
economic development and thus to the growing possibility of the
social division of labor, as argued by Sartre in his A Plea for
Intellectuals (Sartre 1994). Thus, based on the vision of Sartre’s
classical intellectual, governor Maggi would be excluded from this
115
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group. However, this discourse was criticized by Gramsci,
described by him as a methodological error in the distinction of
intellectuals and their role in society.
The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked
for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities,
rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities
(and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them) have their place
within the general complex of social relations (Q12 §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1516;
Gramsci, 1971, p. 8).

If we accept this argument of Gramsci’s, we could overcome this
first objection, and look for the understanding of the intellectuals’
role and origin within social relations and their corresponding
historical context. They are not pure in themselves, but are
products of history, with their consequent commitment to their
social class or group. The supposed neutrality of the intellectuals
usually serves to reinforce the hegemony of the ruling class.
Additionally, Gramsci says that all men are intellectual, and
‘although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of nonintellectuals’ (Q12 §3, p. 1550; Gramsci 1971, p. 9). Thus, we may
conclude that there are different types or profiles of intellectuals,
some of them politically engaged to forge an alternative hegemony,
and others committed to the maintenance of the ruling class
hegemony. For Gramsci, both groups include his category of
organic intellectuals.
We should now face a second category of objection to our
central hypothesis: Do organic intellectuals necessarily mean leftwing politically engaged intellectuals? We have had to face
objections to our analysis based on the mistaken belief that the
term organic intellectual would refers only to the intellectual that is
bound and committed to the working class.
Paolo Nosella (2005), a well-known researcher in Brazil who has
focused on issues of “Work and Education” and the “History of
Education”, and is one of the great contributors in the spread of
the Antonio Gramsci’s ideas, stated that just such a view was quite
common in the 1980s, when many people erroneously felt that all
organic intellectuals would necessarily be progressive, left-wing
militants. Challenging this, Lino Resende (2006), in an article
representing part of his master’s degree dissertation in Social
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History, observes that Gramsci expands the concept of intellectual,
giving a connotation of formulator to organic intellectual, who
could either be of the hegemonic classes or of those who act in the
context of the production of an alternative hegemony in favor of
the subaltern groups and classes. According to the same author
“organic, in short, is the intellectual who participates, who acts,
who helps in the formulation of a new hegemony or engages in the
maintenance of hegemony. On the one hand and the other, the
organicity comes from commitment, from participation, from the
formulation of ideas to help in political action, whether hegemonic
or counter-hegemonic” (Resende 2006, p. 6), where “counterhegemonic” is to be understood as the action of the subaltern
groups involved.
In the passage quoted about the formation of the intellectuals
Gramsci said that “the capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside
himself the industrial technician, the specialist in political economy,
the organisers of a new culture” (Q12 §1, p. 1513; Gramsci 1971, p.
5).
When the general hypothesis of this work was put under debate
at a round-table discussion among academics in 2009, part of the
discussion hinged around just how “organic intellectuals” were to
be understood, and here we saw the emergence of this second type
of objection, as transcribed below:
What disturbs him [about another critic in the discussion group] – and that
is the tone of the thinker whom I support “in spirit” – is exactly to question
why we should give more power to someone who is a usurper of power, who
bitterly and perversely promotes social inequality and environmental injustice
[said of governor Maggi]. For my ideological choice, I refuse to offer Blairo
Maggi this profile [the status of organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector]
because I want to preserve my Gramscian interpretation [of the organic
intellectual – editorial note] as a revolutionary and essentially left-wing militant.
And [I want to] continue to believe that the organic intellectual is one who
fights in favor of the subaltern masses, the excluded, the marginalized, the
shoeless and shirtless, and not just [a title that can be appended] to any specific
group, whatever they are (discussant 1).

As it stands this participant does not seem to take into account
that organic intellectuals may belong to a non-subaltern class, such
as those representing the agribusiness sector. It is important to
remember that although this participant defines himself as a
117
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follower of Gramsci, he prefers give his own interpretation of
Gramsci’s ideas than read carefully Gramsci words. As quoted
above, in Gramsci’s view (Q 12 §1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1513; Gramsci
1971, p. 5) every social group creates together with itself those
intellectuals who are, because of that fact, considered organic ones.
Another representative participant in the discussion also used the
same argumentative logic, again denying the status of organic
intellectual of the agribusiness sector to governor Maggi:
However, the idea of the intellectual that I also passionately advocate for
the popular sectors, as Gramsci also did, is that these sectors develop for
themselves and others sufficient legitimacy of a [new] rationality, true or not,
but developed so as to resist in sharp debate, which has connective threads
allowing them to find points of reference, because [this rationality] will sustain
a more or less coherent and consistent political position. In this sense, there is
an idea of ‘ideology’, of a certain corpus, a certain consistency, that is
independent of ‘the truth’. However I refuse to recognize that the opportunists
whose theoretical framework is only that which provides accumulation, and
whose support points are unassailable because they keep changing their
underlying principles whenever the situation is convenient, and who live by the
chance collection of capital gain, wherever they can find it, without ethical
rules, who opportunistically change the legal and political apparatus, and many,
many times, announce it in public and then undo it in private, I refuse to
recognize that this killer cell [referring to Maggi] can be called a rational
[human being] (discussant 2).

The analysis of these words shows that these people in the
discussion group did not want to allow Maggi the title of “organic
intellectual” since they considered him the representative of the
agribusiness sector, and thus, a conservative stakeholder. Since their
objection is based on their belief that “organic intellectuals” should
be left-wing, this recognition leads us to conjecture that the basis
for their argumentation is more than just a methodological error, as
foreseen by Gramsci: it also seems closer to what Lenin (1940) had
observed and criticized harshly as ultra-leftism. Lenin observed that
“left-wing communism” corresponded to “an infantile disorder of
Leftism” (1940, p. 24) or “left childishness” (1940, p. 26) which, in
commenting on the debate regarding the participation of
communist movements in parliamentary life, he also classified as a
theoretical error. Can we conjecture that the refusal to see what
Gramsci’s theory can offer us (just because of the possibility of
118
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applying the concept of organic intellectual to the governor they
oppose) is a kind of ultraleftism and a theoretical error?
From an academic point of view, before people makes personal
and private interpretations of Gramsci influenced by their own
ideology, it is first necessary that we return to the Gramsci’s original
formulation of the organic intellectual. In this original theoretical
framework, Gramsci just tries to get away from the traditional
image of the intellectual to understand the dynamics and dialectics
of social movements in the world and thus to rethink their
practices. On many occasions it is possible to have in the
progressive front those traditional intellectuals who adhere to a
project of political transformation. But then there are those who are
forged in the historical process, emerging from the factory floor, or
from the social struggles of life (including those who were born in
and remain linked to the agribusiness sector). These are organic
intellectuals. Nevertheless, because of the privileged attention to
those forged from social struggles, there is a misperception of
recognizing as organic only those intellectuals committed to social
change, as was commented on by Nosella (2005). The problem in
the debate is whether we recognize this same process inside the
dominant social class, and this will be discussed below. In
particular, here we are talking about an agriculture sector, which is,
in our times, strongly linked to processes of accumulation in the
form of agribusiness.
This sector includes individuals who have social origins distant
from those situated among the traditional intellectuals, but they
have a historical role in capital accumulation. The strategies and
justifications in the light of globalized capitalism, and of a world in
constant transformation, often require of this sector a highly
dynamic behavior, sometimes having several intellectuals allied to
their political project, while at other times their own members are
required to think and act in favor of themselves. At the present
time, one of the most important things for members of the
agribusiness sector is how to cope with the increasing importance
of environmental issues and how to find strategies for forwarding
their interests of capital accumulation. These preoccupations should
of course consider an evaluation of the correlation of forces, which
may provide decisive elements to strategically opt for an open
confrontation or a veiled face – a matter of hegemony. This can
119
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resemble the strategy of legitimation of neoliberalism, as
demonstrated by Crocetti (2004).
What Gramsci tried to draw attention to is precisely the fact that
there is a movement of theoretical formulation that is seeking
greater social cohesion and practical actions not only on the
revolutionary side, but also on the side of those who desire the
maintenance of the status quo (the ruling class), in different hues. He
also addressed the question that, behind such movements, there is a
quest for greater technical skills (instrumentation), where there is an
obviously selectivity to serve their interests. We have to look at the
whole historical process and the general class interests.
Acknowledging this historical movement does not take away the
character of our left-wing position and commitment to social
justice. It only makes us more cautious regarding what is going on
in terms of social struggles.
One should not therefore rush to assign the term organic
intellectual only to those committed to transformative ideas, either
by denying governor Maggi the profile of organic intellectual, or by
giving him another name as does Semeraro (2006) with the use of
the term ‘functional intellectual’. It should be noted that, contrary
to this trend, Ferreira Jr. and Bittar (2006) attributed to Jarbas
Passarinho the status of organic intellectual in the service of the
then military dictatorship in Brazil. Riley, basing himself on
Gramsci’s Selections from Prison Notebooks, recalled that Moderates
won against Party of Action because, in his view, ‘they were the
organic intellectuals of the Piedmontese bourgeois aristocracy’ in
the Italian Risorgimento of the XIX century (2011, p. 17).
It is important to emphasize here that we are not discussing
personal preferences. One may wish organic intellectuals always to
be left-wing, but we need to understand that we are borrowing a
theoretical framework from someone and we must take over its
originality, preserving what was actually said, and not our own
preference and interpretation. We are free to disagree with the
thought of Gramsci, as others have done, but right now we are
attempting to do him justice.
This does not detract from the value or merits the opposition
presented here by the excerpts quoted from members of the
discussion group. We insist only that we must distinguish what are
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Gramsci’s ideas, based on his writings, and what we think
individually about his ideas.
Thus, regarding Gramsci’s ideas, we should address the fact that
a ruling class relies not only on coercive power and authority but on
consent deriving from hegemony – what Gramsci calls the
“intellectual and moral leadership” exercised by the ruling class.
And it is in this context of (continuously) building and
consolidating hegemony, that he highlights the role and the concept
of the organic intellectual.
5. Maggi as an agribusiness organic intellectual
Governor Maggi tried to announce the forestry policy of the
Mato Grosso state as a great environmentalist achievement and,
therefore, a major advance in line with ecological principles. With
this enhanced status the new Mato Grosso policy came to join a list
of environmentally friendly initiatives, without contradicting the
class interests of the agribusiness sector, a move made possible
because environmental liability was not solved, and costs for
producers are still located in the future. During Maggi’s
governorship there was an exhaustive attempt to ease legislation, so
that, in the light of environmental protections laws, big farmers –
linked to agribusiness – as much as medium farmers and small
peasant farmers could adapt to this new context.
Researchers from the Federal University of Minas Gerais
Environmental Issues Research Group (GESTA / FAFICH /
UFMG), basing themselves on studies on hydroelectric licensing in
the Minas Gerais state found a result that can be compared to the
case of the Mato Grosso state (Zhouri et al. 2005). According to
the group, laws and regulations are often ‘appropriated’ by
capitalism so they are not an obstacle to private economic projects.
In general, these enterprises obtain a connotation of ‘public
interest’ in official discourse. The character of the organic
intellectual can be seen in the Mato Grosso case because the
governor was able to visualize the situation outlined and submit a
practical action guided by (non-emancipatory) class interest,
justified by an instrumental rhetoric, associated with technical
interest (Habermas 1994). Thus, the governor utilized the illusion
that technology alone is sufficient to obtain correct results,
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fetishizing technology as Saito (1995) warned. It is also important
to note that many farmers were expressing opinions based on the
perception at a local and individual scale that indicated some worry
or dissatisfaction with the advancement of SLAPR, since they
believed it could result in a penalty and the surrender of the
agribusiness sector to environmental dictates. This, then, is a
demonstration that these producers did not have the strategic
vision that may be possessed by the organic intellectual, but only an
immediate and dull vision of an anonymous member of the social
class to which they belong. In this context, it was said by many
agribusiness representatives that the governor had forgotten his
origins as a member of the agribusiness sector and was working
against their interests. These criticisms were made without realizing
the advantage that the legalization of deforestation was giving to
the agribusiness sector, legitimizing the occupation of territory and
attracting the most rigorous and exigent markets to the illusion they
had of the end of deforestation. But even this inconvenience and
lack of perception of individual members of the agribusiness sector
also constitute evidence of the nature of “organic intellectual”
represented by Maggi. The organic nature of this type of intellectual
lies precisely in its ability to gather and articulate class interests in a
broad perspective. Organic intellectuals also can be misunderstood
by some individual members of the class that they seek to
represent, but in terms of the final result, they turn out to be
successful because they are able to strengthen and defend class
interests in the medium and long term on a broader scale.
Moreover, by actively seeking to underline the success of SLAPR,
Maggi is trying to establish in Brazilian society a new hegemonic
conception that SLAPR should be copied, as an exemplary model,
by all states within the country and once this status is achieved, very
few would dare to question the successful outcome: SLAPR would
become unassailable and iconic. There would therefore be
confirmation of what Eagleton said of Gramsci’s contribution:
It is with Gramsci that the crucial transition is effected from ideology as a
“system of ideas” to ideology as lived, habitual, social practice – which must
then presumably encompass the unconscious, inarticulate dimensions of social
experience as well as the working of formal institutions.
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In this way, Eagleton addressed the fact that ideology and
hegemony are connected, “the concept of hegemony extends and
enriches the notion of ideology”, considering “hegemony is never a
once-and-for-all achievement, but has continually to be renewed,
recreated, defended, and modified” (1991, p. 115). In concluding
this chain of ideas, we recall that Gramsci’s analysis links ideology
to the historical bloc: such analyses “reinforce the conception of
historical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content
and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form
and content has purely didactic value” (Q 7, §21; Gramsci 1975, p.
869; Gramsci 1971, p. 377; Gramsci 2007, p. 172).
In the Mato Grosso state, as well as the figure of the ex-governor
being closely linked to the agribusiness sector, a fact thus
empowering his policies, there is also the ethos of the hero, which
valorizes someone who challenges difficulties, explores the vast
potential of the country and somehow becomes a solitary pioneer
in his context (Ames and Keck 1997-1998, p. 29). However, this
ethos makes one believe that it is possible to transfer a person’s
private ability to achieve economic growth to the economy of the
community or the whole State. In this case, it is a transposition of
the trajectory of life to politics, when the “primacy of the private”
becomes the power in the “primacy of the public” (Bobbio 1997).
The combination of all these elements contribute to legitimize
Maggi as an organic leader of his class and also as an intellectual
who “makes” new proposals to sustain the hegemony of the
agribusiness sector.
An element that appears as essential to sustain hegemony is the
propagation of an ideology that produces “spontaneous consent”
(again using a phrase of Gramsci’s) for the ruling class. “Ideology
provides hegemony with the possibility of remaining invisible,
disseminated throughout the texture of social life” (Resende 2006,
p. 14). In the case of the Mato Grosso state, the agribusiness sector,
now led by its organic intellectuals, appears to be taking the stance
publicly that it did wrong in the way it promoted land occupation,
although it had reasons for so doing. So, it is showing apparent
regret, and asking for a relaxation of the rules to agree to a new
beginning, a renewed and sustainable one in view of a new socioenvironmental scenario (Layrargues 1998).
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Further, the economic rationale behind the form of land
occupation is not clearly understood by society in general, including
environmentalists. The high profitability generated in only a few
years by agricultural commodities (soybeans and cotton), as
happened in 2003 for example, is also absent from the agribusiness
discourse. It is therefore clear that these justifications are being
used as a legitimizing ideology in favor of this form of production
and occupation of the territory. Marilena Chauí, one of Latin
America’s foremost philosophers and one of Brazil’s most
renowned public and politically engaged intellectuals, outlines how
this process occurs, explaining that
The ideological production of social illusion aims to make all social classes
accept the conditions in which they live, judging them as natural, normal,
correct, fair, without attempting to transform them or really know it [social
illusion], without taking into account the fact there is a profound contradiction
between the actual conditions under which we live and ideas (Chauí, 1997, p.
174).

To accomplish this, effects are taken for causes: there is an
inversion. For example, people used to say that ‘environmental
degradation was caused because there was a need to grow food’ –
and not because the landowners wanted to exploit more areas to get
more profits’; or even ‘environmental degradation has occurred
because farmers were not charged by the government agencies’ –
and not because there was a convenience and connivance, through
an informal institutional logic, such as a practice of corruption
inside the environmental agencies. These are repertoires that are
feeding ideology on agriculture in the Mato Grosso state,
considered as being of ‘vital importance to the state, for Brazil and
the world’. In this search for legitimacy, the environmental issue has
become an arena of contention for the exercise of hegemony by
agribusiness.
This shifting scenario of conflicts, political achievements and
setbacks around the environmental issue has a ‘backstage’ action
which is often not clearly perceived: The agribusiness sector needs
the state government for relaxation of the law. The state
government, in turn, seeks the formulation of agreements and
creation of consensus both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it
tries to establish commitments in favor of the agribusiness sector
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with other levels of the Brazilian government system (i.e. the upper
Federal level and the lower municipal level). Horizontally, the state
government tries to obtain the adherence of other regional
stakeholders, such as industries, financers and environmental
NGOs. Maggi acted in favor of the agribusiness sector, but tried to
be seen as neutral. The agribusiness claim is considered one of the
many external pressures to which the state government needs to
respond. An article on Maggi’s attendance at the 13th Conference
of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change portrays this new position: an awakened vocation to
green issues:
The governor of the Mato Grosso state and soybean king, Blairo Borges
Maggi, came to Bali to outline his newly awakened vocation to the green (and
not green) soy plants. He sat next to Marina Silva, his former archrival, and
signed an agreement yesterday with the Nature Conservancy NGO to raise
US$ 15 million and put all the farms in his state into the SLAPR, the system
for licensing rural properties which allows the mapping of illegal deforestation
by satellite (Angelo 2007).

This process of consultation and agreements between these
seemingly opposing sides allowed the governor to consolidate his
position, i.e. put himself forward as a legitimate representative in
seeking solutions for the productive class, externally as regards nonlocal spheres (such as the Federal Government), and internally as
the provider of environmental solutions for the state. Within this
process of dialogue, the state government, and the figure of the
governor in particular, used the discourse of ‘sustainable
development’ as an ideology. Their hope, along with civil society
organizations, was to build a new ‘agri-environmental’ image, as can
be seen in a statement by Maggi during the Katoomba Meeting,
held in Cuiabá-MT, in April 2009: “here in the Mato Grosso state,
we are not in conflict with the environmental area, we are walking
[together]”.
Thus, it would appear that Maggi, as political representative of
the regional state, but also as political representative of the
agribusiness interests inside the state, is seeking to convince public
opinion that he is forging consensus with other sectors of civil
society.
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Accordingly, the above arguments support the hypothesis
formulated in this paper that Maggi is fulfilling more the role of
organic intellectual for the agribusiness class, once we insert him
into contemporary economic production; he is preparing an ethicopolitical concept, and enabling himself to pursue the organizational
function of establishing social, political and economic hegemony.
He is aware of his class representation and serves not only to build
a consensus around the political project of his class, but also to
ensure the legal and administrative functions necessary for it, as
well as the maintenance of political power in society. He is aware of
the type of production required by the global project of his class
and has acted materially and culturally (working in the sphere of
infrastructure and superstructure) for this purpose, mainly to
strengthen the process of capital accumulation by agribusiness in a
legitimated way when faced with environmental rhetoric.
Moreover, Maggi is also connected to the most advanced sectors
of the agribusiness social group, in the sense that these sectors
possess a historical view with long-term strategies, aiming at
strengthening their positions regarding social struggles. Many
members of his own class, because they are more conservative and
attached to traditional forms of struggle and accumulation, do not
understand his strategy of expansion and the consolidation of
hegemony.
A new detail, to which it is worthwhile paying attention, should
be noted in this scenario: after the initial analysis was done in
accordance with the guidelines of this article, focusing primarily on
the legitimacy of deforestation via SLAPR, ex-governor Maggi was
subsequently elected as a new senator of the Republic from the
Mato Grosso state. His arrival in the National Congress, just when
a draft revision of the Brazilian Forest Code was formulated – the
changes effectively eased a number of environmental protective
rules – shows a multiple-fronted strategic action, in great synchrony
with a broader national movement of the agribusiness sector. It is
now clearer to see that these fronts include the removal of legal
barriers, so as to legitimize the mode of land use by agribusiness,
not to mention the change in legislation supported by the legislature
in a representative democracy. This new scenario only reinforces
the framework of analysis here presented, based on the Gramscian
concept of the organic intellectual.
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All these events are in accordance with the arguments put
forward by Mayo (2011) that the State regulates economic agencies
by working in tandem with them, and although appearing to be
neutral, it effectively engages in structured partnerships with
industry (in this case, agribusiness) to secure the right basis for the
accumulation of global capital.
6. Conclusion
The analysis of socioenvironmental conflicts, the apparent
contradictions in State policies, and their implementations in the
Mato Grosso state of Brazil, allow us to reflect more carefully on
the paradox of a state that has records for deforestation and was
governed by a significant representative of agribusiness, which is
also at the same time implementing a modern and apparently
efficient System for Environmental Licensing of Rural Properties
(SLAPR) in order to control deforestation within the state. The key
for understanding this paradox comes from the theoretical
elaboration in Gramsci, mainly through his concept of the organic
intellectual. The insight provided by this concept helps to reveal the
hidden contradictions designed to curb the jingoism around SLAPR
and allows us to carefully evaluate their potentialities and
limitations. Despite some resistance from left-wing intellectuals in
applying this concept to the proposed situation, we have here
shown that such an unfounded resistance is caused by a misreading
of the original concept of organic intellectual. Moreover, we argue
that the Gramscian concept of organic intellectual is still valuable in
its original form in present-day conditions and contributes to
understanding complex situations involving policy makers and
social processes, especially when these situations are marked by a
contradiction that formal logic classifies as a paradox.
This experience of Maggi’s mediation and leadership, even in the
environmental arena, shows that the organic intellectual is not
necessarily revolutionary, nor does s/he have to be left-wing:
indeed, as Gramsci notes: the ‘political party, for all groups [...] is
responsible for welding together the organic intellectuals of a given
group – the dominant one – and the traditional intellectuals’ (Q 12,
§1; Gramsci 1975, p. 1522; Gramsci 1971, p. 15). Maggi is an
organic intellectual of the agribusiness sector and, because of that,
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was able to achieve the position of governor through a political
party, and then in addition, the position of senator of the Republic
at a crucial moment of the struggles between environmentalist and
agribusiness sectors around the law for the protection of native
vegetation. Maggi – in his role as governor – acted as a formulator
of the ethico-politico-cultural propositions of the agribusiness
sector for the whole of society, making alliances with
environmental groups that were former opponents in the public
sphere.
At this point, let us refer back to the guiding questions posed in
this work: how, in the Mato Grosso state, could the representatives
of agribusiness create the illusion that this economic sector is on
the way to conversion to an environmentally friendly practice? How
could the state government, headed by the largest soybean
producer, be recognized as a government that implements
environmentally-friendly policies? How is it that this same state
government, in contradiction to its new image, simultaneously
honors and boosts the production of commodities and their way of
land occupation by intense deforestation and opening new areas of
planting? In this sense, the set of findings that was commented on
as answers to these questions indicate that a way was conceived to
legitimize the capitalist production of commodities in the state,
headed by an organic intellectual representative of the productive
sector, namely the agribusiness one.
At the current time, all who seek a role in favor of sustainable
practices in the private and the public spheres, guided by critical
thinking, still have much to learn. More than that, intellectual
vigilance is required to correctly perceive the movements of
concealment, accommodation and coupling to an environmental
discourse without the corresponding practical results. The Mato
Grosso state is one example of these situations that require an
open-minded posture, so to evaluate more carefully the potential of
SLAPR and recognize the historical limits to which this system is
conditioned. In this way, we can break the illusion and fetishization
around technology on which this system is based, recognizing that a
deforestation control system cannot, a priori, be considered
successful only because it is being supported by remote sensing
technology and GIS.
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Finally, this case study has been an attempt, based on Gramscian
concepts applied to the present, to describe how agribusiness as a
social force intends to formulate a hegemonic project around the
idea of sustainability, and to investigate how these forces of capital
become internalized in a particular form of state or how they are
resisted.
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